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BURDENING THE PLAINTIFF: PROVING
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AFTER KASTANIS V.
ED UCA TIONAL EMPL 0 YEES CREDIT UNION
Andrea J. Menaker
Abstract- In Kastanis v. Educational Employees Credit Union,1 the Washington Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff who presents direct, undisputed evidence of discrimination bears
the burden of persuading the jury that the employer's actions were not justified by business
necessity. By substantially increasing the plaintiff's burden, this decision will make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to successfully litigate employment discrimination claims in
Washington State. Not only is the court's reasoning contrary to existing state and federal law,
but there are also strong policy reasons arguing against the continued application of the
court's rule.
The Educational Employees Credit Union (EECU) terminated Peggy
Jones's employment when she married a co-employee, Dean Kastanis.
Peggy Jones began working for the EECU in 1973. Originally, Ms.
Jones was a teller, but after her promotion in the early 1980s, she became
an accounting manager. Dean Kastanis was appointed Chief Executive
Officer of the EECU in 1973. In 1985, Mr. Kastanis and Ms. Jones
began seeing each other socially. Although the EECU had previously
had in place a policy precluding employment of close relatives without
prior approval of the Board of Directors, it abolished this policy in 1986.
On October 5, 1989, Mr. Kastanis informed the Board that he and Ms.
Jones would marry within two weeks. The Board concluded that this
marriage would result in a conflict of interest.2
Specifically, the Board expressed concerns that the marriage would
result in a conflict of interest because Mr. Kastanis, the CEO, would
have supervisory authority over his wife in her role as accounting
manager. Additionally, the CEO and accounting manager were
responsible for auditing each other's work.3 Notwithstanding the
Board's disapproval, Peggy and Dean married on October 21, 1989.
1. 122 Wash. 2d 483, 859 P.2d 26 (1993), amended, 865 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1994).
2. Id. at 486, 859 P.2d at 28.
3. Id. at 496-97, 859 P.2d at 33.
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Four days later, the Board voted to terminate Peggy.4 and two months
after Peggy's discharge, the Board asked Dean to resiga.5
Ms. Kastanis6, responded by suing her employer for sex
discrimination under state and federal law and for wrongful discharge,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and marital status
discrimination under Washington State law.7 On the issue of marital
status discrimination, the trial judge charged the jury that the plaintiff
had the burden of proving that: (1) she was married to another employee
of defendant's company; (2) she was terminated from her employment
with the defendant; and (3) but for her marital status, she would not have
been terminated.8 The judge further instructed that, should the jury find
that Ms. Kastanis had proved these propositions, it should enter a
judgment for the plaintiff. Alternatively, if the julry found that the
defendant had proved the "business necessity" of its practice, it should
render its verdict for the defendant.9 The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff on the issue of marital status discrimination.O
The EECU appealed the judgment, and the court of appeals certified
the EECU's appeal to the Washington Supreme Court. The supreme
court vacated the judgment and remanded the case, holding that the
judge's instruction was erroneous because it placed the burden of
persuasion" on the employer to prove the defense of business necessity.
The court held that the employer merely has a burden of production 2
4. Id. at 486, 859 P.2d at 28.
5. Id. at 487, 859 P.2d at 28. The court's statement of facts gives no indication as to why Dean
Kastanis was terminated from his job. This fact, however, was not relevant to the disposition of this
case.
6. Ms. Jones adopted her husband's name after their marriage.
7. Id. The applicable Washington statute provides: "It is an unfair practice for any employer...
[t]o discharge or bar any person from employment because of age, sex, marital status, race, creed,
color, national origin, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability .... Wash.
Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (1994).
8. Kastanis, 122 Wash. 2d at 489, 859 P.2d at 29.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 487, 859 P.2d at 28. The trial court granted summaryjudgment for the defendant on the
Title VII, wrongful discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distre.s claims. The jury ruled
against Ms. Kastanis on her sex discrimination claim. Id.
11. The burden of persuasion has been defined as "[t]he onus on the party with the burden of
proof to convince the trier of fact of all elements of his case." Black's Law Dictionary 196 (6th ed.
1991).
12. The burden of production has been defined as "[t]he obligation of a party to introduce
evidence sufficient to avoid a ruling against him on the issue. Such burden is met when one... has
introduced sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case, though the cogency of the evidence
may fall short of convincing the trier of fact to find for him." Id.
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with regard to this defense and the burden of persuasion remains with the
plaintiff to prove the absence of business necessity. 3 This ruling is the
focus of this Note.
This Note begins with an examination of existing federal and state
employment discrimination law. Part II then analyzes and criticizes the
holding in Kastanis v. Educational Employees Credit Union on three
separate grounds. First, this Note argues that when a plaintiff provides
direct, undisputed evidence of discrimination the burden should be on the
employer to justify its actions. Second, it contends that a bona fide
occupational qualification defense, and not a business necessity defense,
should have been applied. Finally, it argues that, even applying a
business necessity defense, the court should have placed the burden of
proving the defense on the employer.
I. FEDERAL AND STATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW
A. Relationship Between State and Federal Law
A plaintiff may bring a federal claim for unlawful employment
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) which
prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."4 In addition, many states have enacted statutes similar to Title
VII prohibiting employment discrimination and providing an employee
with a state, as well as a federal, cause of action for employment
discrimination."5 In Washington, Title 49 of the Revised Code of
Washington (RCW) is patterned after Title VII 6 but expands Title VII's
13. Kastanis, 122 Wash. 2d at 493-94, 859 P.2d at 32.
14. Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees
or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
15. Title VII is not intended to be the exclusive remedy for those claiming employment
discrimination but rather is intended to supplement existing fair employment practices and laws.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974).
16. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 790 F. Supp. 1516, 1525-26 (E.D. Wash. 1992)
(stating that the "order of proof, burdens of production, and ultimate burden of persuasion are the
255
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protection by adding additional categories of prohibited discrimination,
including marital status. 7 Under Title 49, the term marital status refers
not only to the condition of being married or singl, but also to the
identity of one's spouse." Thus, an employee who is discharged or
discriminated against because of the identity or occupation of the
employee's spouse has a cause of action for marital status discrimination.
Because Washington's employment discrimination law is patterned after
federal law and the Kastanis court relies on federal case law in its
opinion, federal authority is relevant to the applicable defenses and the
placement of burdens in Kastanis.
same under both Title VII and RCW § 46.90"); Oliver v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 106 Wash. 2d
675, 678, 724 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1986) (holding that Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60 is patterned after Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act and therefore decisions interpreting Title VII are persuasive authority in
interpreting Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60); Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash. 2d 368, 376, 610 P.2d
857, 861 (1980), amended, 621 P.2d 1292 (Wash. 1981) (finding federal authority persuasive in
construing state employment discrimination statute); Hollingsworth v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank,
37 Wash. App. 386, 390, 681 P.2d 845, 848 (1984) (holding that state courts should look to
interpretations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act when construing Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60
because the two statutes are substantially similar).
17. See supra note 7. The Washington State employment discrimination statute applies to "any
person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, whc employs eight or more
persons, and does not include any religious or sectarian organization not organized for private
profit." Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(3) (1994). An employee who is employed by his or her
"parents, spouse, or child, or [employed in the] domestic service of any person" is not covered by
this statute. Id.
18. Because the legislature had not defined the term "marital status" in 1993, the Human Rights
Commission promulgated the following rule: "[D]iscrimination against an employee or applicant for
employment because of (a) what a person's marital status is; (b) who his or her spouse is; or (c) what
the spouse does, is an unfair practice because the action is based on the person's marital status."
Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150 (1992). See also Washington Water Fower Co. v. Washington
State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash. 2d 62, 68-69, 586 P.2d 1149, 1153 (1978) (holding that the
Human Rights Commission did not exceed its authority by promulgating rules which stated that
discriminating against an employee based on the identity or occupation of the employee's spouse
constitutes marital status discrimination). In 1993, the legislature amended the RCW by adding a
definition of marital status. Martial status under the RCW is now defined as "the legal status of
being married, single, separated, divorced, or widowed." Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040 (1994). In
the future, this amended provision may eliminate the cause of action for marital status discrimination
based upon the identity of one's spouse. No state court, however, has addressed this issue, so it is
unclear whether courts will continue to abide by previous decisions broadly interpreting the
definition of marital status or will now adopt a more restrictive definition. Notwithstanding this
statutory amendment, the court's ruling in Kastanis will affect all future eraployment discrimination
cases because it changes the traditional placement of the burdens of proof.
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B. The Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case
Under federal law, an employee who feels that she 9 has been
discriminated against may bring suit under either a disparate treatment
theory of discrimination or a disparate impact theory of discrimination.0
As in all civil cases, the plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit
bears the burden of proving a prima facie case by a preponderance of the
evidence.2' In the employment discrimination area, a plaintiff may
present a prima facie case of discrimination either by providing direct
evidence of discrimination, or more commonly, by providing indirect
evidence of discrimination. Because plaintiffs often choose to present a
prima facie case by using indirect evidence of discrimination, the courts
have established a burden-shifting scheme applicable to both disparate
treatment and disparate impact employment discrimination cases.
1. Disparate Treatment
When a plaintiff sues under a disparate treatment theory, the plaintiff
is alleging that the employer has intentionally discriminated against her.'
To prove disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
has acted with discriminatory intent by demonstrating that the
employer's action was at least partially motivated by an illegitimate
purpose.' A plaintiff may present a prima facie case of disparate
treatment by presenting direct evidence of discrimination.24 Because the
majority of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases do not possess
direct evidence of discrimination,' plaintiffs generally establish a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination using the three-step burden-
shifting test articulated in a trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court cases,
19. Because the plaintiff in Kastanis is a woman, this Note uses the pronoun "she" throughout the
paper for the sake of simplicity and consistency.
20. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713 n.1 (1983); Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 n.5 (1981); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335-36 n.15 (1977); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 790 F. Supp. 1516, 1525 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (citing Oliver v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 106
Wash. 2d 675, 678, 724 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1986)).
21. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53;
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336; Hollingsworth v. Mutual Say. Bank, 37 Wash.
App. 386,390, 681 P.2d 845, 848 (1984).
22. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
23. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241-42.
24. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
25. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 271 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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beginning with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,2t and adopted by
Washington State.'
To establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under the
McDonnell Douglas formula, the plaintiff must first allege that she was a
member of a protected group, was discharged, was replaced with a
member not within that protected group, and was qualified to do the
job.28 Once the plaintiff establishes these four elements, the factfinder
may infer unlawful discrimination. The second part of the McDonnell
Douglas formula then allows the defendant to rebut the inference of
discrimination by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its actions.29 The defendant's burden at this stage is one of production,
not of persuasion.30 If the defendant meets its burden of producing a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, the third part of the
test requires the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that she has been intentionally discriminated against.3 Once a plaintiff
has established a prima facie case, either by meeting the McDonnell
Douglas test or by presenting direct evidence, the burden-shifting
scheme drops from the case.32 The McDonnell Douglas test thus aids a
26. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711 (1983); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
27. Kastanis v. Educational Employees Credit Union, 122 Wash. 2d 48:;, 490, 859 P.2d 26, 30
(1993), amended, 865 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1994) (citing Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, Inc.,
110 Wash. 2d 355,364,753 P.2d 517,521 (1988)).
28. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6; Intemational Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 357-58 (1977); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Kastanis, 122
Wash. 2d at 490, 859 P.2d at 30.
29. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6; International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 357-58; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Kastanis, 122 Wash. 2d at 490, 859 P.2d at
30.
30. If the defendant does not offer any legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action, it has
failed to meet its burden and judgment should be entered for the plaintiff. The defendant's burden,
however, is not to persuade the court that it was motivated by the legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason that it has articulated, but merely to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
defendant did actually discriminate against the plaintiff. Kastanis, 122 Wash. 2d at 490, 859 P.2d at
30 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 257).
31. Until recently, a plaintiff could meet her burden by demonstrating that the legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons offered by the defendant were merely a pretext fior discrimination. See
Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714-15; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; McDonnell Dozglas, 411 U.S. at 804;
Kastanis, 122 Wash. 2d at 30-31, 859 P.2d at 491. A pretext is an "[o]stcnsible reason or motive
assigned or assumed as a color or cover for the real reason or motive; fals- appearance, pretense."
Black's Law Dictionary 1187 (6th ed. 1991). But see St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct.
2742, 2751 (1993) (holding that a plaintiff cannot prevail on a disparate trcatment claim by merely
convincing the factfinder that the reasons offered by the defendant were pretaxtual, but instead needs
to affirmatively prove that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her).
32. Kastanis, 122 Wash. 2d. at 491, 859 P.2d at 31 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10).
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plaintiff in making out a prima facie case of discrimination, although the
ultimate burden of persuading the factfinder that the defendant has
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with
the plaintiff.33
2. Disparate Impact
When a plaintiff brings a disparate impact claim, she is not alleging
that the employer has intentionally discriminated against her but instead
is alleging that a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate impact on
a protected group.34 To establish a prima facie case in a disparate impact
case, the plaintiff must present evidence that the employer's practice
selects employees in a significantly discriminatory manner.35 The intent
underlying the employer's action, therefore, is not relevant.36 To prove
disparate impact, a plaintiff usually relies on statistical evidence to show
that the employer's employment practices operate to discriminate against
a group,37 and the parties' arguments consequently center on competing
explanations for the statistical disparities.
C. Defenses
If a plaintiff relies on indirect evidence of discrimination, an employer
may escape liability if it articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for its actions and the plaintiff fails to convince the trier of fact
that the employer did in fact engage in discriminatory behavior. Even if
a plaintiff meets her burden of persuading the factfinder that she has been
discriminated against, however, an employer may sometimes escape
liability through one of two separate defenses. Under federal law there
33. Id. at 492, 859 P.2d at 31 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
34. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
35. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Contreras v.
City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981).
36. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
37. Id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines have established a
"four-fifths rule" which allows a plaintiff to instruct the jury that it may draw an inference of
disparate impact discrimination when the class allegedly discriminated against occupies less than
twenty percent of the jobs in question. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1993). This approach has been
severely criticized and Washington courts have explicitly rejected this rule. See Shannon v. Pay 'N
Save Corp., 104 Wash. 2d 722, 728-29, 709 P.2d 799, 804-05 (1985) (holding that rule should not
be applied because (1) the jury should be free to form its own opinion based on the evidence
presented without adhering to a mechanical formula; (2) the formula lacks both a substantive and a
statistical basis; and (3) adopting this rule would compromise Washington's policy of avoiding jury
instructions that comment on the evidence or emphasize certain portions of the case).
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are two distinct defenses, the "bona fide occupational qualification"
(BFOQ) defense and the business necessity defense. 'These two defenses
arise in different contexts and cannot be interchanged. Disparate
treatment may sometimes be justified by showing that the practice is
based on a bona fide occupational qualification, while disparate impact
may be justified by demonstrating that the practice is mandated by
business necessity.
1. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense
Title VII provides the employer with a BFOQ defense which relieves
an employer who intentionally discriminates against an employee from
liability under limited circumstances. The BFOQ defense permits
otherwise discriminatory actions when an employer can prove that those
actions are necessary to the normal operation of its particular business or
enterprise.38 To prove a BFOQ defense, an employer must persuade the
factfinder that all or substantially all members of the excluded class
cannot safely and effectively perform essential job duties.39 Because
Congress intended the BFOQ to be a narrowly construed exception to the
prohibition against discrimination," courts have consistently held that a
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees.., on the basis of...
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, ;ex, or national origin
is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the noimal operation of that
particular business or enterprise ....
The BFOQ language indicates that the defense is applicable to hiring situtitions, but federal courts
have interpreted this language more broadly to apply to other employment situations, including
discharges. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (Federal Aviation
Administration regulation requiring flight engineers to retire at age 60); Johnson v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353 (1985) (Federal Civil Service statute requiring firefighters to
retire at age 55); Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984) (policy requiring
transfer of preguant flight attendants).
Washington courts have similarly applied the BFOQ defense to employment situations outside of
hiring, such as discharges, although the statute itself indicates that the defense is only applicable to
hiring situations. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (1994) ("It is an unfair prnctice for any employer
(1) to refuse to hire any person because of age, sex, marital status.... unless based upon a bonafide
occupational qualification ... (2) To discharge or bar any person from employment because of age,
sex marital status ... "(emphasis added)).
39. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
40. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,333 (1977); Weeks, 408 F.2d at 232. See also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.2 (1993); 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964) (stating that § 703(e)(1) creates a "limited
exception"); H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
Burdening the Plaintiff
defendant must bear the burden of persuasion in establishing a BFOQ.
41
This interpretation comports with a traditional canon of statutory
construction: when there is a humanitarian remedial statute which serves
an important public purpose, the burden of proving an exception to the
general policy of the statute should be upon the person claiming the
exception.42
2. Business Necessity Defense
While the BFOQ is a defense to some disparate treatment
discrimination claims, "business necessity" is the appropriate defense to
a disparate impact discrimination claim.43 After a plaintiff presents a
prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, the employer may
escape liability by showing that the exclusionary practices are manifestly
related to job duties.' However, even if the employer can show that
there is a manifest relationship between the discriminatory practice and a
significant business purpose, the defendant may still be liable if the
plaintiff can demonstrate that there was an alternative method of
achieving the employer's articulated purpose that would have either a
lesser or no adverse effect on the protected group.45 Like the BFOQ
defense, the burden of persuading the factfinder that business necessity
required the utilization of the discriminatory practice lies with the
employer.46
41. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698, 702 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
42. Weeks, 408 F.2d at 232 (citing Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490,493 (1952)).
43. Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash. 2d 368, 379-80, 610 P.2d 857, 863 (1980), amended, 621
P.2d 1293 (Wash. 1981).
44. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Over the
years, the federal courts have changed the requirement of what an employer must prove to prevail on
a business necessity defense. For instance, the test has ranged from needing to prove that the device
in use was necessary to the normal operation of the business to having to show that the device was
merely job-related. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (holding that employer must show that requirement was
necessary to the normal operation of the businesses in order to prevail on a business necessity
defense); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1021 (1982) (holding that business necessity is established if requirements are significantly
correlated with important elements of the job). The least stringent standard was imposed by the
Supreme Court in Wards Cove v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), discussed infra notes 90-94 and
accompanying text, where the Court held that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the
practice was not manifestly job-related.
45. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S 792, 804 (1973)); EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 328 (8th Cir. 1986);
Contreras, 656 F.2d at 1285.
46. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; Contreras, 656 F.2d at 1285; Fahn, 93
Wash. 2d at 382 n.4, 610 P.2d at 865 n.4.
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3. Differentiating Between the Two Defenses
The burden of proving a BFOQ defense is substantially greater than
the burden of proving that a requirement is justified by business
necessity. In order to prevail on a BFOQ defense, an employer must
demonstrate that virtually all members of the excluded cl.ass are unable to
perform the job, while in order to prevail on a business necessity defense,
an employer generally need only show that a job requirement bears a
manifest relationship to the job.
When a policy or action is facially discriminatory, the plaintiff will
have a claim of disparate treatment and a BFOQ will be the appropriate
defense. For instance, in Dothard v. Rawlinson,4 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the employer needed to prove a BFOQ in order to justify
its policy prohibiting the employment of female prison guards. The
BFOQ defense was appropriate in that instance because females are a
protected class under Title VII and the policy in question explicitly
discriminated against women. In order to justify its policy of not hiring
persons shorter than 5 feet 2 inches for certain positions, however, the
employer only needed to prove the business necessity of this
requirement. This distinction was correct because perso:as under 5 feet 2
inches, unlike women, are not a protected class under Title VII.a
Because the challenged policy did not facially discriminate against a
protected class, the plaintiffs needed to prove that the policy had a
disparate impact on a protected class because a larger percentage of
persons under 5 feet 2 inches are women. Consequently, the employer
needed to demonstrate the business necessity of the height requirement
as a defense to the disparate impact claim.49
47. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
48. At least one Washington Supreme Court Justice has stated that persons who are discriminated
against because of their height are a protected class because they have a physical handicap. Fahn, 93
Wash. 2d at 387, 610 P.2d at 867 (1980) (Dolliver, J., dissenting). A handicap has been defined as
"a disadvantage that makes achievement unusually difficult; esp: a physical disability that limits the
capacity to work." Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. State Human Rights Comm'n, 87
Wash. 2d 802, 805, 557 P.2d 307, 310 (1976) (emphasis in original). Thu;, according to Justice
Dolliver, employers should only be able to discriminate against persons based on their height if they
can show that the minimum height requirement is a bona fide occupational qlUdification.
49. Levin v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984), provides another example of this
distinction. In Levin, a class of women brought suit challenging the airline's policy prohibiting the
employment of pregnant flight attendants. Prior to the Pregnancy Act Ameadment of 1978, these
women would have needed to sue under a disparate impact theory because they were alleging that
Delta's policy had a disparate impact on woman, a protected class. After the Amendment, however,
pregnant women became a protected class, and those discriminated against on the basis of their
pregnant condition could sue under a disparate treatment theory. Id. at 996.
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The United States Supreme Court again distinguished between the
BFOQ and business necessity defenses in International Union, U.A. W. v.
Johnson Controls." In Johnson Controls, the defendant's company
policy forbade women employees of childbearing age from working in
areas where they would be exposed to significant amounts of lead." The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the policy did not
constitute sex-based discrimination because the employer had proved its
business necessity.5 2  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
defense of business necessity was inapplicable because the policy was
discriminatory on its face and could therefore only be validated if the
employer could prove that not being a woman of childbearing age was a
BFOQ.
53
II. KASTANIS v. EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT CREDIT UNION
A. The McDonnell Douglas Formula is Inapplicable in this Case
In Kastanis, the court confused the business necessity defense with the
legitimate business justification prong of the McDonnell Douglas test.
The fact that Ms. Kastanis presented direct, undisputed evidence of
discrimination removes this case from the McDonnell Douglas formula.
Business necessity is a defense to a claim of disparate impact, while the
legitimate business justification prong of the McDonnell Douglas test is a
formula devised to assist a plaintiff who lacks direct evidence in making
out a prima facie case. An employer bears the burden of persuasion with
regard to a business necessity defense, whereas the employer only bears
the burden of production with regard to the legitimate business
justification defense. These two defenses are distinct, serve utterly
different purposes, and are, in any case, inapplicable here.
The three-step burden-shifting test devised in McDonnell Douglas is
used when a plaintiff attempts to make out a prima facie case of
discrimination but does not have direct evidence of discrimination. An
employer accused of discrimination typically denies that an action taken
50. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
51. Id.
52. The Court accepted Johnson Controls's argument that its policy was justified by business
necessity because it was needed to protect women working in these areas from suffering an increased
risk of bearing children with birth defects. Significantly, even though the appellate court applied the
wrong defense, it placed the burden on the employer to prove the business necessity of its actions.
Id.
53. Id. at 199-200.
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was for the improper reasons stated by the plaintiff. In doing so, the
employer often asserts that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for its actions. Courts adopted the McDonnell Douglas formula because
they recognized that plaintiffs almost always lack direct evidence of
discrimination54 and therefore need to rely on circunstantial evidence
from which a jury could draw an inference of discrimination. The
McDonnell Douglas formula thus permits plaintiffs to make out a prima
facie case based on that inference.
55
Courts have repeatedly stated, however, that the burden-shifting
scheme presented in McDonnell Douglas is inapplicable when a plaintiff
presents direct evidence of discrimination. 6  Thus, when the defendant
admits that it has discriminated against the plaintiff on a prohibited basis
but offers an excuse for that action, the plaintiff has raade out a prima
facie case and the McDonnell Douglas formula is no longer needed.
When there is direct evidence of discrimination, the discriminatory
policy is presumptively invalid and the defendant may escape liability
only by proving an affirmative defense.
In Kastanis, the plaintiff presented direct, undisputed evidence of
discrimination: the defendant intentionally discriminated against her due
to her change in marital status when she married a co-worker. The
employer did not dispute this allegation but rather justified
54. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
55. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (citing Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979)).
56. Trans WorldAirlines, 469 U.S. at 121; Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464,467 (lst Cir.
1990). See also Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 200 (citing the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's statement that "[flor the plaintiff to bear the burden of proof in a case in which there
is direct evidence of a facially discriminatory policy is wholly inconsistent with settled Title VII
law."); Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court of Adair County, 825 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that
direct evidence of discrimination removes the case from the McDonnell Douglas formula because
the plaintiff no longer needs the inference of discrimination); Grimwood v. University of Puget
Sound, Inc., 110 Wash. 2d 355, 362-63, 753 P.2d 517, 520 (1988) (stating that the McDonnell
Douglas formula aids a plaintiff in making out a case of discrimination with circumstantial
evidence). In Price Waterhouse, Justice O'Connor reasoned as follows:
[Tihe entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact
that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by. That the employer's
burden in rebutting such an inferential case of discrimination is only one o rproduction does not
mean that the scales should be weighted in the same manner where there is direct evidence of
intentional discrimination.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 271 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The critical question
is whether a plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant intentionally
discriminated or retaliated against the plaintiff for engaging in protected activity." (citing Sumner v.
United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990))).
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discriminating against the plaintiff on the grounds of business necessity.
Thus the employer was offering a defense, and the application of the
McDonnell Douglas formula was inappropriate given that the plaintiff
offered direct proof of discrimination under a disparate treatment theory.
If the plaintiff had presented evidence of discrimination that had been
disputed by the employer, then the court would have been correct in
applying the McDonnell Douglas formula and placing the burden of
persuasion on the plaintiff after the employer had offered a legitimate
reason for its actions. In that scenario, however, the plaintiff has not
made out a prima facie case. The McDonnell Douglas formula would
therefore be applicable because the employer has not conceded that it has
acted in a discriminatory manner, but is alleging that its actions have
been misinterpreted.
The Kastanis court's misapplication of McDonnell Douglas also led it
to misconstrue the Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks." Unlike the plaintiff in St. Mary's, the plaintiff in Kastanis
offered direct, undisputed evidence of discrimination. The Kastanis court
correctly noted that in St. Mary's the Supreme Court held that even after
the plaintiff had proven that the reasons given by the defendant employer
were pretextual, the plaintiff still had to carry the burden of persuasion
on the issue of whether he was discriminated against. St. Mary's,
however, differs from the present case in one important respect: in St.
Mary's, the defendant employer disputed the employee's allegation of
discrimination. The plaintiff in St. Mary's alleged that his discharge was
racially motivated. The defendant employer rebuffed that charge and
claimed that the plaintiff was discharged for legitimate reasons and not
because of his race. The Supreme Court held that once the defendant
employer had provided legitimate reasons in support of its actions, the
burden-shifting scheme dropped from the case and the plaintiff needed to
prove the ultimate issue; that is, that he had been the subject of
discriminatory action. In contrast, the employer in Kastanis did not
claim that Ms. Kastanis was terminated for any reason other than her
marriage to Mr. Kastanis. The burden to disprove the business necessity
of an employer's practice should not shift to the employee even under St.
Mary's, and the Kastanis court's reliance on St. Mary's is therefore
misplaced.
58. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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B. A BFOQ and Not a Business Necessity Defense Should Have Been
Applied
In Kastanis, the court should have required the employer to prove a
BFOQ defense, not a business necessity defense. Because the BFOQ
defense is more difficult to prove than the business necessity defense,59
the court's determination of the applicable defense is crucial to the case.
The Kastanis case is a disparate treatment case, for the plaintiff has made
undisputed allegations that she was fired for marrying the CEO.60 Thus,
the EECU in effect claimed that not being married to the CEO was a
bona fide occupational qualification for the job of acc:ounting manager.
The employer supported this claim with assertions that an accounting
manager married to the CEO would be unable to ftlfill the essential
functions of her job, which included auditing the CEO's work and
receiving supervision from the CEO. Because business necessity is only
a defense to a disparate impact claim, whereas a BFOQ is a defense to a
disparate treatment case, the Kastanis court should have held that the
employer needed to prove a BFOQ.
The regulations implementing the employment discrimination
provisions in Washington also support the conclusion that a BFOQ, and
not a business necessity defense, should have been applied in this case.
The Human Rights Commission (-RC) 6' recognizes that in some
instances it may be justifiable for an employer to discriminate against an
employee based upon marital status.62 In order to relieve employers from
liability in these circumstances the regulations state that
business necessity may justify action on the basis of what the
spouse does, and where this is so the action will be considered to
59. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198.
60. This case would be a disparate impact case if the company policy that prohibited the
employment of close relatives were still in place, resulted in the termination of married spouses, and
had a disparate impact on one sex. However, because the policy was not in place at the time of Ms.
Kastanis's termination, she was not suing to invalidate the policy. Rather, she was asserting
disparate treatment because she was discriminated against on the basis of an unlawful categorization.
The Kastanis court recognized this distinction when it stated, "this case involves allegations of
disparate treatment, not disparate impact... [and therefore] we do not address the burdens of proof
in disparate impact cases." Kastanis v. Educational Employees Credit Union, 122 Wash. 2d 483,
859 P.2d 26 (1993), amended, 865 P.2d 507, 507 (Wash. 1994).
61. The Human Rights Commission possesses general jurisdiction and power to enact provisions
intended to eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.020
(1993); Washington Water Power Co. v. State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash. 2d 62, 586 P.2d
1149 (1978).
62. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150 (2)(b) (1992).
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come within the bona fide occupational qualification exception to
the general rule of nondiscrimination. 'Business necessity' for
purposes of this section includes those circumstances where an
employer's actions are based upon a compelling and essential need
to avoid business-related conflicts of interest, or to avoid the reality
or appearance of improper influence or favor.63
In draffing the pertinent regulations, the HRC likely contributed to the
Kastanis court's confusion by using the terms "business necessity" and
"bona fide occupational qualification" in the same sentence. These are
terms of art in the area of employment discrimination, and the term
"business necessity" thus does not take on its everyday usage. The HRC,
in attempting to carve out examples of when discrimination based on
marital status would not be prohibited, described these instances in terms
of business necessity. Notwithstanding the ambiguity in the regulation's
language, the fact that the statute and the regulation both use the term
bona fide occupational qualification' when referring to the defense of
business necessity is evidence that the legislature intended that the
defendant bear the more stringent burden of proving a BFOQ defense.
The term "business necessity," unlike the term "bona fide occupational
qualification," is more likely to be included in a regulation without intent
to attach any particularized meaning to the phrase. Because the term
BFOQ is a specialized term and has been used in the federal courts to
define a particularized phenomena, it is probable that the NRC intended
to create an affirmative defense when using the term.
Not only have the legislature and the Human Rights Commission used
the terms "business necessity" and "bona fide occupational qualification"
interchangeably, but the HRC has also inconsistently defined BFOQ.
For instance, portions of the regulation support the contention that the
HRC did not intend to make the BFOQ defense any more stringent than
the business necessity defense. First, the HRC acknowledges that the
legislature did not define the term "BFOQ" and then continues to state
that a BFOQ will be granted "[w]here a person's race, creed, color,
national origin, age, sex, marital status or handicap will be essential to, or
63. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150(2) (1992).
64. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 provides: "It is an unfair practice for any employer ... [t]o
refuse to hire any person because of age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national origin, or the
presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability . .. unless based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification .... (emphasis added). Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150(2) (1992)
provides: "[Bjusiness necessity may justify action on the basis of what the spouse does, and where
this is so the action will be considered to come within the bona fide occupational qualification
exception to the general rule of nondiscrimination." (emphasis added).
267
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will contribute to, the accomplishment of the purposes for which the
person is hired."65
This definition is not as strict as the one employed by the federal
courts because it suggests that a policy may qualify for a BFOQ when
discriminating will merely contribute to the effectiveness of the
business's operation. This interpretation, however, is questionable when
read in conjunction with another provision of the Washington
Administrative Code (WAC) which reads: "The commission believes
that the BFOQ should be applied narrowly to jobs for which a particular
quality . . . is essential to the accomplishment of the purposes of the
job.
66
This latter provision is more in tune with the definition employed by
the federal courts, and Washington courts have applied the more
stringent definition of BFOQ.67
Not only have the federal courts applied a BFOQ defense to disparate
treatment cases, but other states that have statutes prohibiting marital
status discrimination have also characterized an employer's defense as a
BFOQ. These states have placed the burden on the employer to prove
that all, or substantially all, of the plaintiffs in that class would be unable
to satisfactorily perform essential job functions.68  For example, the
language of the Minnesota statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of marital status is substantially similar to Washington's statute,69 and the
65. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-020(2)(a) (1992).
66. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-130 (1992) (emphasis added).
67. Franklin County v. Sellers, 97 Wash. 2d 317, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1106 (1983). In Franklin, the County challenged the administrative agency's reliance on federal
case law in interpreting the BFOQ defense and alleged that the language of ihe WAC indicated that
Washington courts should adopt a less stringent standard for a BFOQ defense. The court, however,
rejected this argument and held that reliance on federal case law was proper and that a literal
interpretation of the WAC regulation, which would allow an employer's tictions to qualify for a
BFOQ exemption whenever the practice contributed to the job's effectiveness, would frustrate the
purposes ofRCW § 49.60. Id. at 327-28, 646 P.2d at 117-18. While this a-gument was seemingly
settled by the court in Franklin, the Kastanis court's confusion highlights tho. necessity of clarifying
the statute and regulations in order to make the language consistent wih federal employment
discrimination jurisprudence.
68. See Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 816 P.2d 302, 304 (Haw. 1991); Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284
N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979).
69. The Minnesota Human Rights Act states:
Except when based on a bona fide occupational qualification, it is ar unfair employment
practice: ... [flor an employer, because of... marital status ... to refuse to hire or to maintain a
system of employment which unreasonably excludes a person seeking employment; or... to
discriminate against a person with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading,
conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment.
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Minnesota Supreme Court has held that an employer must advance a
bona fide occupational qualification when the employer discriminates on
the basis of marital status.7" The Hawaii Supreme Court has likewise
held that "[only] where an employer can show that the marital status of
the employees has a relationship to the statutory exception for bona fide
occupational qualifications, [can] a refusal to hire, or a termination ... be
upheld."'" Thus, Washington courts should consider that other states
which similarly interpret their marital status discrimination statutes have
placed the burden of persuasion on the employer to prove a BFOQ in
order to justify discriminating against a person on the basis of marital
status.72
C. The Employer Should Bear the Burden of Proving a Business
Necessity Defense
Not only did the Kastanis court apply the wrong defense, but more
importantly, the court erred when it held that the employer did not bear
the burden of persuasion with regard to the business necessity defense.
Even though the court applied a business necessity defense in a disparate
treatment case, it should have placed the burden of persuasion for
proving the business necessity defense on the employer. With a brief
exception,73 federal courts have consistently held that the burden of
persuasion on the issue of whether a requirement is job-related rests with
the employer.74 Furthermore, the Washington Supreme Court itself has
Minn. Stat. § 363.03 (West 1991).
70. Kraft, 284 N.W.2d at 388.
71. Ross, 816 P.2d at 304.
72. Because the regulation's language is likely to continue to cause confusion in the courts, the
legislature should direct the Human Rights Commission to redraft the pertinent WAC regulations
and omit the language of "business necessity." Employers would still be able to escape liability
under the regulation when they could prove that all or substantially all members of the class of
persons discriminated against were unable to safely and efficiently perform essential job functions.
Redrafting the regulation in this fashion would thus address the legislature's concern while
clarifying the law. Additionally, the regulations should be amended to provide one consistent
definition of a BFOQ. If Washington courts plan to continue to rely on federal case law in their
interpretation of employment discrimination cases, it would be wise for the HRC to adopt the more
stringent BFOQ definition which comports with the federal courts' definition and to delete all other
potentially conflicting language.
73. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), discussed infra notes 90-94 and
accompanying text.
74. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) ("Congress has placed on the
employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question.").
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stated that the burden is on the employer to show the business necessity
of a particular practice.75
The Kastanis court's decision to place the burden ofpersuasion on the
plaintiff to prove the defense of business necessity reszts in large part on
its refusal to characterize the appropriate defense as an affirmative
defense. In making this determination the court properly looked to "(1)
whether the statute reflects a legislative intent to treat absence of the
exception or the existence of a justification as one of the elements of a
cause of action or (2) whether the justification negates an element of the
action which the plaintiff must prove."76
With respect to the first part of the test, the Kastans court found that
the legislature intended to treat the absence of business necessity as one
of the elements of a cause of action for employment discrimination. In
reaching this conclusion, the Kastanis court relied on the language in
Title 49 of the RCW, which uses the terminology of a bona fide
occupation qualification when creating an exception to the prohibition
against employment discrimination.7 7 The court then stated that the bona
fide occupational qualification is not defined by the statute but that the
regulations promulgated by the HRC provide some guidance by stating
that "business necessity may justify action on the basis of what the
spouse does, and where this is so the action will be considered to come
within the bona fide occupational qualification exception."7
Consequently, the court determined that because it found no indication
that the bona fide occupational qualification of business necessity was
intended to be an affirmative defense, it was error for the trial court to
assign the burden of persuasion on the issue to the employer.79
75. The Fahn court stated:
While we have made an effort to distinguish between the BFOQ and business necessity defenses
as they are discussed in the federal Title VII cases, we have also noted that the effect of each
defense is the same: the burden is on the employer to show that the prac:ice is necessary to the
successful performance of the job.
Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash. 2d 368, 382 n.4, 610 P.2d 857, 865 n.4 (1980), amended, 621
P.2d 1293 (Wash. 1981).
76. Kastanis v. Educational Employees Credit Union, 122 Wash. 2d 483, 493, 859 P.2d 26, 31
(1993), amended, 865 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1994) (citing State v. McCullum, 9E Wash. 2d 484,490, 656
P.2d 1064, 1068-69 (1983)).
77. Id. at 492, 859 P.2d at 31. Wash. Rev. Code §49.60.180 (1994) state;, "It is an unfair practice
for any employer... [t]o refuse to hire any person because of age, sex, raarital status, race creed,
color, national origin, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability... unless based
upon a bona fide occupational qualification."
78. Id. (citing Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150 (2) (1992)).
79. Id. at 493, 859 P.2d at 31.
Vol. 70:253, 1995
Burdening the Plaintiff
In making this determination, the court seemingly overlooked a
crucial factor. The regulation previously relied upon by the court does in
fact address the question of the burdens of proof in cases brought under
this statute. WAC 162-16-150(6), entitled "Burden of justification,"
states:
[S]ince the bona fide occupational qualification is an exception to
the general rule of nondiscrimination, the burden is on the
employer, employment agency, or labor organization to show that
the discrimination is justified.0
The Kastanis court never acknowledged this language. Nevertheless, the
regulation's language evinces an intent to treat the defense of business
necessity as a narrowly construed affirmative defense on which the
defendant must bear the burden of persuasion.
Applying the second prong of its test to determine whether the
employer's defense ought to be an affirmative defense, the Kastanis
court looked to whether the justification of business necessity negates an
element of the action that the plaintiff must prove. In making this
determination, the court analogized this case to State v. McCullum,1 a
first-degree murder case. In that case, the Washington Supreme Court
held that the burden of persuasion on the issue of self-defense rested with
the prosecution because self-defense negated the necessary element of
intent required for a conviction of first-degree murder."2 Therefore, the
McCullum court concluded that the state has the burden of proving the
absence of self-defense in a murder case once the defendant has proposed
the defense.83
The analogy drawn by the Kastanis court between placing the burden
of proving the absence of self-defense on the state in the McCullum case
and placing the burden of proving the absence of business necessity on
the employee in the Kastanis case fails for several reasons. First, the
analogy is inapposite because McCullum involved a criminal statute.
Although the Kastanis court summarily rejected the argument that a case
interpreting a criminal statute should not be relied on by a court
80. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150(6) (1992). The WAC also cites to Weeks v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). The Weeks case characterizes the BFOQ exception as
an affirmative defense and states that the burden of proof is on the employer to demonstrate that the
offered justification falls within the BFOQ exception. Id. at 232.
81. 98 Wash. 2d 484, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983).
82. Id. at 496, 656 P.2d at 1072.
83. Id.
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interpreting a civil statute," the court's reasoning on this point is
unpersuasive. According to Washington's criminal law statutes, intent is
an element of first-degree murder." Intent is what distinguishes first-
degree murder from other classes of homicide.86 By contrast, the federal
and state employment discrimination statutes do not contain any mention
of business necessity within their definition of the act of employment
discrimination. Furthermore, the McCullum court only attempted to
analyze whether intent negated an element of first-degree murder
because the criminal statute did not directly address the question of
which party ought to bear the burden of persuasion or. the issue of self-
defense." However, this is not the case in the employment
discrimination context where the pertinent regulation plainly places the
burden of proof on the employer.8 Because the regulation itself answers
the question of burden placement, it was unnecessary for the court to
analyze this issue under McCullum.
Moreover, the employer's actions in Kastanis fell within the definition
of marital status discrimination, and business necessity should therefore
have been treated as a defense, and not as an element to be disproved by
the plaintiff. Finally, the court's cursory statement fails to acknowledge
that the justice system affords greater constitutiorial protections to
criminal defendants.89 Consequently, the Kastanis court's reliance on a
case interpreting the burdens of proof applicable in a criminal case is
misplaced.
84. In response to this argument, the Kastanis court stated, "[w]hile McCullum involved a
criminal statute, its analysis is equally applicable here." Id. at 493, 859 P.2d at 32.
85. "A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when: ... [w]ith a premeditated intent to
cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third
person...." Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.32.030(1)(a) (1994).
86. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.32.030 (1994). A person acting in self-'efense cannot be acting
intentionally as defined by statute because acting intentionally requires that the person act with the
objective or purpose of accomplishing a result which constitutes a crime. McCullum, 98 Wash. 2d at
495, 656 P.2d at 1071.
87. The new criminal code is "conspicuously silent on the quantum or burden of proof as to self-
defense." McCullum, 98 Wash. 2d at 492, 656 P.2d at 1070. "Since the Legislature has not clearly
imposed the burden of proving self-defense on criminal defendants, we conclude [that] the
obligation to prove the absence of self-defense remains at all times with the prosecution." Id. at 494,
656 P.2d at 1071 (citing State v. Roberts, 88 Wash. 2d 337, 345, 562 P.2d 1259, 1263 (1977)).
88. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
89. Compare the "preponderance of the evidence" standard used in civil zases with the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard applicable in criminal cases. The burden of p:'oof is more likely to be
shifted from criminal defendants to the state because a criminal defendant's due process rights are
implicated when he or she is forced to carry the burden on a particular issue, and an error in this
context is reversible because it is of constitutional magnitude. See McCullum, 98 Wash. 2d at 488,
656 P.2d at 1067 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)).
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The Kastanis court also relied on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio9
to support its determination that the employer's burden of proof with
respect to a legitimate business justification is only a burden of
production, not a burden of persuasion. This reliance, however, is
misplaced for several reasons. First, Wards Cove was a disparate impact
case and dealt only with the burdens of proof applicable in disparate
impact cases.9 The Kastanis case, on the other hand, is a disparate
treatment case and thus requires a different analysis of the burdens of
proof. In fact, the court itself acknowledged that the Kastanis case was a
disparate treatment case and consequently limited its holding to disparate
treatment cases. 92
Furthermore, the Wards Cove case erroneously construed the
employment discrimination statutes and rejected prior case law, thus
prompting Congress to pass the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which overruled
the Court's interpretation of Title VII enunciated in Wards Cove.93
Specifically, the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 state:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this title only if--(i) a complaining party
demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to
90. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
91. Id. at 645.
92. See supra note 60.
93. The legislative history to the 1991 Civil Rights Act includes the following excerpts:
The purposes of this Act are... to codify the concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job related'
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., [citation omitted], and in the
other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, [citation
omitted]; ... [and] to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope
of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of
discrimination.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 3(2), (4) (1991).
"The Congress finds that.., the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, [citation omitted] has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights
protections; and . . . legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful
discrimination in employment." Id. § 2(2), (3).
"Mr. President, for nearly 2 years many of us have been attempting to put together a civil rights
bill that would redress problems created by the Supreme Court of 1989, particularly a bill that would
reinstate the Griggs decision and that would overrule the Wards Cove decision." 137 Cong. Rec.
15,277 (1991) (statement of Senator Danforth).
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demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity .... '
Additionally, Section 104 of the Civil Rights Act states that "[t]he
term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of production and
persuasion." Thus, the 1991 Civil Rights Act directs the courts to place
both the burdens of production and persuasion on an employer who is
asserting a business necessity defense to an allegation of employment
discrimination in a disparate impact case.
In essence, Wards Cove, a discredited disparate impact case, is wholly
inapplicable to Kastanis. The court, in fact, accepted this proposition by
stating that its opinion only addresses the burdens of proof applicable in
disparate treatment cases, and yet the court inexplicably placed heavy
reliance on the Wards Cove decision. Although it is preferable for the
court to disregard entirely disparate impact cases in this context, absent
this condition the court should, at a minimum, take the changes made by
the 1991 Civil Rights Act into consideration.
D. Policy Considerations Favor Placing the Burden on the Employer
to Prove Business Necessity
Placing the burden of persuasion on the employer to prove business
necessity as a defense to an intentional discrimination claim is also
warranted on a number of policy grounds. First, this approach is
consistent with the purposes of the anti-discrimination laws. These laws
were passed in order to prevent the invidious effects of discrimination.
In some instances, however, the legislature has recognized that
discrimination may be justifiable.95 In these cases, the burden should be
on the party claiming that it has a valid reason to discriminate. The
employer in these cases is already engaging in the type of activity that
these laws are designed to prohibit. Consequently, the employer should
bear the burden ofjustifying its actions.96
94. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 105.
95. This exception is very narrow. An example of when discrimination may qualify as a BFOQ is
taking sex into consideration for a theater role. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1993).
96. Kastanis provides a compelling example of the type of discriminalion that the legislature
sought to prevent when it passed the prohibition on marital status discrimination. Mr. Kastanis and
Ms. Jones were openly involved in a relationship for four years prior to their marriage. Kastanis v.
Educational Employees Credit Union, 122 Wash. 2d 483, 486, 859 P.2d 26, 28 (1993), amended,
865 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1994). Thus, many of the concerns articulated by the employer as a
justification for terminating Ms. Kastanis were present prior to her marriage. One may assume that if
Mr. Kastanis and Ms. Jones had not married but had merely continued their intimate relationship,
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Second, in employment discrimination cases, the employer, and not
the employee, will more likely know why an employment decision was
made.97 An employer has greater access to information concerning the
employer's employment decisions.98 Access to that information makes it
much easier for an employer to prove that an employment decision was
based on business necessity than it is for an employee to prove the
absence of business necessity.99 Additionally, requiring the plaintiff in
an employment discrimination case to prove the absence of the business
necessity of the defendant's practice forces the plaintiff to prove a
negative-an extremely difficult, and in some situations impossible, task.
Furthermore, earlier cases placing the burden of persuasion on the
employee relied on policy justifications which are not applicable in the
present case. For instance, in Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence00 the
Washington Supreme Court held that the burden of persuasion remained
on the employee to prove that he was discharged without cause.'01 In
that case the court expressed concern that shiffing the burden of
persuasion to an employer would cause employers to remove just cause
clauses from their employee handbooks in order to avoid future
liability.0 2 This concern, however, is not present in a discrimination
context, for no employer has the option to relieve itself of an obligation
not to discriminate on prohibited grounds.
Finally, Washington law is more liberal than federal law in the area of
employment discrimination in that Washington has included marital
status discrimination in its statute while Title VII does not apply to
discrimination based on marital status. The Washington legislature has
and perhaps even if they had chosen to live togetler, Ms. Kastanis would not have been terminated.
Thus, it was precisely the change in Ms. Kastanis's marital status that prompted her termination.
This type of action is exactly what the statute is designed to guard against.
97. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977); Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,773 n.32 (1976).
98. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359 n.45 ("Presumptions shifting the burden of
proof are often created to reflect judicial evaluations of probabilities and to conform with a party's
superior access to the proof") (citing C. McCormick, Law of Evidence §§ 337, 343 (2d ed. 1972)).
See also Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Development of
the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 719,768 (1991).
99. Some courts have taken the opposite stand because in their view liberal discovery and EEOC
rules give plaintiffs adequate access to employment files. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981). However, these files are often unhelpful. Business
necessity is often proven not by resort to employment files, but by resort to company policy.
Moreover, it is unfair to make a plaintiff demonstrate the best way to run a business.
100. 112 Wash. 2d 127,769 P.2d 298 (1989).
101. Id. at 136, 769 P.2dat303.
102. Id. at 135-36, 769 P.2d at 302-03.
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directed that the laws against discrimination be construed liberally. 3
Thus, it would make little sense for the legislature to pass a more
encompassing law than Congress, while the Washington courts interpret
this law more narrowly than the federal courts interpret Title VII.
III. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court should retreat from its position that a
plaintiff who presents direct, undisputed evidence of employment
discrimination bears the burden of persuading the factfinder that the
employer's actions were not justified by business necessity once the
employer articulates a reason for its actions. The McDonnell Douglas
formula, upon which the court relies, should only be used to assist a
plaintiff in making out a prima facie case where there is indirect evidence
of discrimination. In those cases, once an employer has articulated a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions, it is entitled to a
presumption that it has acted in good faith, and ii is therefore the
employee's burden to convince the factfinder that die employer has
discriminated against her. However, when an employee has direct,
unrefuted evidence of discrimination, as did the plaintiff in Kastanis, the
employer ought to bear the burden of persuading the factfinder that its
discriminatory actions were justified. This principle is supported by both
federal and state case law and statutes. In order to guarantee that
Washington's employment discrimination statutes are construed in
accordance with federal standards, the legislature ought to direct the
Human Rights Commission to redraft portions of the relevant regulatory
provisions by specifically deleting misleading references to the business
necessity defense in the disparate treatment context.
103. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.020 (1994).
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